PFIB SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

1. What information reached J-2 MACV in the period 15-30 January indicating the possibility of the attack on the cities?

    a. Origin of information.

    b. Quantity?

    c. Accuracy?

    d. Timeliness?

    e. Identification of enemy units engaged in the attacks:

        (1) Extent.

        (2) Conclusions reached from this identification.

2. Attacks where responsible field commanders had sufficient warning from intelligence channels to avoid surprise.

    a. How many?

    b. Where? (Show on a map where Communist attacks were frustrated).

3. Extent of information from Vietnamese civilians to authorities:

    a. How much before attacks?

    b. How much during attacks?

    c. What had Vietnamese intelligence and security personnel acquired prior to attacks?

4. Extent of "free and rapid" information exchange between:

    a. GVN and US agencies.

    b. The several US agencies.

    c. The GVN agencies.

5. What "substantive evaluated information" on the attacks reached:

   a. General Westmoreland.

   b. JCS.

   c. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

   d. DCI.

   e. The President.

   f. Ambassador Bunker.

6. Based on the intelligence received, what picture of the situation did these officials have (insofar as it can be judged)?

   a. General Westmoreland.

   b. JCS.

   c. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

   d. DCI.

   e. The President.

   f. Ambassador Bunker.

2

<u>MACV</u>

1. Assemble material required for posed questions.

2. Brief on procedures for processing and initiation of indications intelligence.

3. Prepare response to query concerning the amount and type of substantive evaluated intelligence information which reached General Westmoreland.

4. Arrange a field itinerary to include:

    a. Corps and field level headquarters.

█████████████████████

25X1A

SECRET

## EMBASSY SAIGON

1. Brief on state of warning of the offensive to include:

    a.  Extent of information received from Vietnamese civilians:

        (1)  Before attacks.

        (2)  During attacks.

        (3)  Information held by Vietnamese intelligence and security personnel.

    b.  Extent of free and rapid exchange between:

        (1)  US-GVN agencies.

        (2)  The several US agencies.

        (3)  The GVN agencies.

SECRET

Confidential

25X9☐

1. Provide any warning information received during 15-30 January.

2. Brief on material received.

3. Brief on procedures for processing and evaluation of indications intelligence.

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[REDACTED]

25X1A

1.  Assemble material collected through [REDACTED] channels.

    a.  Extent Vietnamese civil population provided information before and during the attacks.

    b.  Extent of information held by Vietnamese intelligence and security personnel.

    c.  How much free and rapid exchange of information took place between:

        (1)  GVN-US agencies.

        (2)  The several US agencies.

        (3)  The GVN agencies.

2.  Provide briefing on items in Question 1 to include CAS evaluation.  **25X1A**

3.  Brief on [REDACTED] procedures for processing and evaluation of indications intelligence.

4.  Provide office space and clerical support.

5 March 1968


MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:  PFIAB's Request for Post-Mortem on the
          Tet Offensive


     1.  General Taylor, as chairman of PFIAB, has asked
the DCI to undertake an appraisal of a number of questions
concerning intelligence warning of the Communist Tet of-
fensive.  The study is to be delivered to General Taylor
by 1 April.  The DCI has informed USIB of the request and
has given action to the DDI, who has in turn designated
me the CIA officer responsible.  The following paragraphs
contain my initial thoughts on the project.

     2.  The PFIAB has made a request which is appropriate,
indeed virtually mandatory, for it to make.  The DCI must
respond, and must do so in a manner which will disarm fu-
ture critics.  This response must seem thorough, and it
cannot be self-serving.

     3.  At the same time the problem General Taylor puts
to us is very important, very large, and very ticklish.
It is too important not to do, it is too large to do thor-
oughly, and it is too ticklish to do in a way which would
really serve the nation.  The bulk of the work must be
done in Saigon, largely in MACV, by people who are trying
to fight a war.  Events we are to investigate, and past
frictions, will make the Saigon agencies excessively sensi-
tive to any Washington-based investigation of this kind.
Moreover, the real questions, which General Taylor does
not ask but should, would be painful indeed to answer and
will be difficult to avoid.

4.  We can probably give PFIAB most of what it asks for, while making a minimum of waves in Saigon, by a procedure which would ask MACV and our station to assemble raw material on General Taylor's questions a through d.  A USIB working group would then go to Saigon, study the materials, ask the necessary follow-up questions, interview a few people in general nonharassing terms, and bring the whole collection back to Washington for drafting.  A report prepared this way probably would, I think, tell the Board honestly what happened, point to remediable shortcomings, and conclude that everyone did his best in a difficult situation.

5.  To accomplish this much, the support of Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler must be enlisted.  They in turn will have to tackle General Westmoreland.  The Embassy, MACV, and the station can be assured in advance that we want to keep the approach low-keyed and factual, and to hold the workload on them to a minimum.  An important question arises here with respect to timing.  Unless this spadework can be done very quickly, i.e., in the next two days, it will not be possible to meet General Taylor's deadline.  In that case he might be asked to extend it to 1 May.

6.  I have attached General Taylor's letter, a proposed scenario, and some proposed revisions to the terms of reference.

25X1A

Deputy Director of Current Intelligence

Attachments:  a/s